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Introduction
One of the main questions in the field of finance is that of how securities are priced. 
Many models have been constructed in attempts to address this question, one of the first, and 
of the most popularly used, being the Capital Asset Pricing Model (the CAPM). However, 
though it is widely used, the model has had its fair share of criticism coming from studies that 
have produced evidence that the model may not be empirically valid. This is perhaps due to the 
fact that the CAPM is a model that adheres to the assumptions of the field of traditional finance, 
and more specifically, can be closely tied to the assumptions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH). Thus, it is possible that the reason there is so much evidence against the CAPM’s 
validity is that EMH does not hold. That is, perhaps markets are actually not efficient.
A new field (with old roots) called behavioral finance has emerged to address this 
possibility that markets aren't efficient. This field combines psychology with finance in attempts 
to explain the anomalies that cannot be explained by EMH. Behavioral finance neither attempts 
to define “rational” behavior, a core assumption of the CAPM and EMH, nor does it deem 
decision making as faulty (Olsen, 1998). Rather, it remains consistent with sound economic 
concepts and principles and attempts to understand the implications of decision processes on 
financial markets (Olsen, 1998).
The scope of this paper investigates whether or not the CAPM applies to a particular 
portfolio: the portfolio managed by the Redlands Student Investment Fund (RSIF). The 
Investment Fund is a “non-profit, student-run organization that manages stock investments and 
models a cooperative corporate structure for the educational benefit of its members and the 
student-body (RSIF Constitution).” Currently, the Fund manages a $40,000 portfolio in the form 
of an endowment from the university, and it focuses first and foremost on its goal of providing an 
educational learning experience for its members. The Fund aims to familiarize students of all 
majors with the valuation of securities, stock and bond markets, and investment strategies while 
also providing them with beneficial experience in leadership, teamwork, and making 
professional presentations. The Fund aims to “beat the market” and earn a sizable return on the 
portfolio that ultimately goes back to the University. Overall, both the university and its students 
benefit from the organization, as it provides an extracurricular activity for students that allows
I.
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them to become more informed on a subject playing an increasingly important role in their lives
2 | K e n n a
and one that can potentially help them in their careers.
So when it comes down to RSIF students valuating securities for the Fund's portfolio, is 
the CAPM a reliable model to use? This paper seeks to answer this question, beginning with a 
review of literature on EMH and the CAPM that looks at how the two are intertwined, or rather 
how EMH is arguably the heart of the CAPM. This literature review also looks at the results of 
empirical studies that have been done in the past on both topics in order to look at what evidence 
has already been brought against both. It is followed by an empirical test of the CAPM and its 
application to RSIF's portfolio. By running first- and second-pass regressions on the monthly 
returns of 15 stocks in RSIF's portfolio, the results of the test indicate that the CAPM cannot be 
applied to the portfolio. A second literature review is then done that focuses on past empirical 
works in the field of behavioral finance. These works are reviewed in attempts to discuss why, 
according to the results of the empirical test, the CAPM model may not be a sound model for 
valuating securities in the portfolio of the Redlands Student Investment Fund.
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II. Literature Review
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
Paul Samuelson first helped to give form to EMH in 1965, his contributions to it having 
been summarized rather neatly in the title of his article, “Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices 
Fluctuate Randomly.” Samuelson's interest in the mechanics of prices led him and his students to 
several research agendas that included solutions for the problems of dynamic asset allocation 
(rebalancing a portfolio so that its asset mix reverts back to its original long-term target) and 
consumption-savings (wherein income increases in an economy, but excessive saving drains the 
economy of its income and reduces investment). Eugene Fama, on the other hand, took a 
different path with his own papers (1963, 1965, 1968, 1970), based on his interest in the 
statistical properties of stock prices (Lo, 2007). He was one of the first to use digital computers 
to conduct empirical finance research, which led to him yielding significant empirical 
contributions such as numerous economic tests of linear asset-pricing models (Lo, 2007). Since 
then, EMH has been extended in other directions, with some landmark papers extending their 
frameworks to allow for risk-averse investors and other papers including the incorporation of 
non-traded assets.
In 1978, American economist Michael Jensen declared that “there is no other proposition 
in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market 
hypothesis (Economist, 2009).’’ The origins of EMH go back to the beginning of the 20th century, 
but it was just reaching its height of dominance in the 1970s, thus making Jensen's remark quite 
a statement for its time {Economist, 2009). Set forth in 1970 by economist Eugene Fama, EMH 
generally asserts that securities markets are efficient in reflecting information about the market as 
well as about individual stocks (Lo, 2007). When information rises, news spreads quickly and is 
incorporated into security prices in an equally timely fashion (Malkiel, 2003). Thus, the financial 
prices of all market securities accurately reflect this public information at all times, and change is 
due only to sensible information combined with theoretical trends at the time (Shiller, 2000). 
Thus, deviations from equilibrium will not last long.
This, in turn, assumes that people as economic agents are rational, efficient, and unbiased 
processors of relevant information (Brooks & Byrne, 2008). In other words, the value they place
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security is based on its fundamental value (a security's intrinsic value based on perceptions 
of its true value) (Yalyn，2010). This includes both quantitative and qualitative factors such 
company’s business model, governance, financial statements, and financial ratios. When 
investors learn something about a security, it is automatically reflected in the price of the security 
(Yalpn, 2010). Competition among investors further implies that stock prices reflect information 
quickly and accurately, or else there would be profit opportunities to be exploited (Bodie, Kane 
& Marcus, 2009).
Furthermore, it is assumed that investors make decisions that will maximize their utility 
(Brooks & Byrne, 2008). When prices are too high given expected returns, rational investors will 
sell. On the other hand, when the price of a share is too low, well-informed investors will take 
advantage of this and buy the stock. Investors can be left to make their own decisions as long as 
risks are fully disclosed (Cohen, 2012). Additionally, trying to beat the market is fruitless: if 
there is information out there, it's already been factored into the price of a security. Thus, 
speculation helps to stabilize securities' prices, and neither technical analysis (studying trends in 
past stock prices in order to predict future prices) nor fundamental analysis (analyzing financial 
information to choose “undervalued” stocks) can help an investor receive greater returns 
(Malkiel, 2003).
on a
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2.1 EMH and Bubbles
One implication of EMH is that if it were to hold, bubbles would not be able to form, or 
at least they couldn't last for very long, because they would be spotted by someone and popped. 
However, if this is the case, what can then be said about the dot-com boom of the late 
1990s/early 2000s, or of the even more recent housing crisis? Were these not bubbles? According 
to Princeton economist Burton Malkiel, bubbles do exist, but the problem lies in recognizing 
them in advance. Malkiel maintains that we know stock prices were crazy in March 2000, and 
condo prices were nuts, but essentially we have to wait for the bubble to end before we can 
realize we've been in one (Nocera, 2009).
Yet, EMH maintains that bubbles cannot form. Indeed, in an interview in 2007, Eugene 
Fama, the father of modem finance and EMH, said of the speculated credit bubble:
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I don’t know what a credit bubble means. I don’t even know what a bubble 
means. These words have become popular. I don't think they have any 
meaning...They have to be predictable phenomena. I don’t think any of this was 
particularly predictable...Can you have a bubble in all asset markets at the same 
time? Maybe you can convince me there can be bubbles in individual securities. 
It's a tougher story to tell me there’s a bubble in a whole sector of the market, if 
there isn’t something artificial going on. (Clement, 2007)
When asked if he didn't believe in the possibility of bubbles, he responded:
People have jumped on the bandwagon of blaming financial markets. I can tell a 
story very easily in which the financial markets were a casualty of the recession, 
not a cause of it. (Clement, 2007)
When the question of bubbles came up once again in a later interview, Fama asserted that there 
were two crashes in the last century: the crash of '29, after which the market went down, and the 
crash of *87, wherein the market subsequently went up (Cassidy, 2010). One 
underreaction while the other was an overreaction, both of which arc not uncommon, but rather 
are to be expected if the market is efficient.
Both Fama and EMH hold that bubbles do not occur, even in the face of the recent 2008 
housing crash. According to Fama, houses are not so liquid, so people are careful when buying 
them, taking time to look around and compare prices (Cassidy, 2010). But the crash did happen, 
so shouldn't this make us skeptical of the validity of EMH?
was an
2.2 “Random Walk”
One of the reasons EMH holds that bubbles cannot form is because they would have to be 
predictable, but they aren’t because prices aren’t predictable. EMH is often associated with the 
idea of a “random walk” whose logic is that tomorrow's price changes will reflect only 
tomorrow's news- independent of today’s price changes- as long as the flow of information is 
uninterrupted and is factored into the price immediately. In other words, in very competitive
information. News, however, is unpredictable by 
definition, and the flow of new information is random (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). Thus, 
price changes are also unpredictable and random and fully reflect all known information. 
Essentially, even uninformed investors can buy a diversified portfolio at the prices given by the 
market and make just as high a return as that made by experts (Malkiel, 2003).
markets, prices should react only to new
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One way to better understand this is through use of the Random Walk Model, an auto­
regression model (one that assumes that past values have an effect on current values) that looks 
at the first difference of a series in attempts to find a predictable pattern there (Duke). This is also 
known as an AR(1) model, wherein the degree 1 indicates one step back for the time period. The 
first difference of time series data is the difference from one observation to the next (CSUS). The 
Random Walk Model (orAR(l) Model) takes the following form:
Pt=Pt-i + et (2.1)
wherein Pt is a given security's value at time period t, Pn is the value of the security at time
period t-1 (one time period before), and et is the estimated error term at time period /.
In this forecasting model, it is not the time series data that is random, it’s the differences 
(the changes from one period to the next) that are random. The model predicts that the value of a 
security is equal to its value last period, plus some constant that represents the average change 
between periods. From one time period to the next, the original time series takes a random “step” 
away from the last observation (Duke). This pattern can be compared to a path left by an 
intoxicated person who steps randomly to his left or right at the same time that he takes a step 
forward; he leaves behind a random walk to be traced.
Adding a separate constant term to the above model would deem it a “random walk with 
a drift.” The drift term adds a trend to the random walk {Duke). For example, a drift term greater 
than zero means that the random walk would have an upward trend, while a drift term less than 
would indicate a downward trend. Figure 2.1 portrays the difference between a standard 
random walk, and a random walk with a positive drift.
zero
Figure 2.1 Random Walk
RMdMiWalk lUndom WMk Drill
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The earliest empirical work on the random walk hypothesis was done in 1900 by 
Bachclier, who found a random walk pattern in commodities (though, of course, he didn’t use the 
term “random walk”，as it is believed to not have been first used until 1905) (Karan & 
Kapusuzoglu, 2010). Later evidence garnered from times series data was found by Working 
(1934), Cowles and Jones (1937- analyzing stock prices in the US), and Kendall (1953- 
analyzing the prices of stocks and commodities in the UK). In 1959, Roberts discovered that the 
time series generated by a random set of numbers had the same appearance as that of US stock 
prices. That same year, Osborne found that movements in stock prices were not only similar to 
the random motion of physical particles, but their logarithms were also independent of each • 
other.
EMH seeks to explain the idea of a “random walk” in holding that new information 
moves security prices significantly, and since new information occurs at random, movements in 
stock prices are also random. This news is still instantaneously factored into security prices, 
thereby making it impossible to outperform the market by picking mispriced securities because 
EMH holds that there aren’t mispriced securities in the market.
2.3 Forms of EMH
There are three forms of EMH: weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form (Bodic, 
Kane & Marcus, 2009). They vary based on the information set each one uses. The first of these, 
weak form EMH, uses historical (past) data as relevant information, such as historical prices and 
trading volume (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). The implication here is that if the markets arc 
weak form efficient, use of historical information provides no benefit “at the margin.” In other 
words, one cannot beat the market by simply using past information and data. Investors can still
have positive returns, but nothing in excess over that of the market return (i.e. no normal return).
all publicly availableThe second form of EMH is semi-strong EMH. This 
information as relevant information, and is inclusive of past price and volume data. That is, it 
uses all available information from the past and the present (as opposed to weak form, which 
only includes past information). It also asserts that one cannot beat the market using public 
information. If the markets are semi-strong efficient, studying past price and volume data while 
also studying earnings and growth forecasts provides no benefit in predicting price changes at the
uses
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margin (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009).
The third form of EMH is strong form EMH. This includes all relevant information, both 
public and private. However, private information refers to information only available to 
company insiders, more commonly known as insider trading, which is illegal. SEC Rule 10b-5 
“limits trading by corporate insiders (officers, directors and major shareholders)”, essentially 
requiring them to report their trades in attempts to limit them from making a profit on 
information available to them only. Doing so would place them in violation of the law. Thus, our 
market does not follow strong form EMH, since investors cannot legally use insider information 
to beat the market.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between the three different forms of EMH.
Figure 2.2 The Three Forms of Market Efficiency
It should be noted that semi-strong efficiency implies that weak form EMH also holds, but not 
vice versa. Strong form efficiency implies that both semi-strong and weak form also hold, as it is 
inclusive of the two.
2.4 Security Analysis
The type of security analysis used in weak form EMH is technical analysis, also known 
as trend analysis (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). “Techies” and chartists are known for using this 
type of analysis, which involves looking at charts and trends over time and using prices and 
volume information to predict future price changes. A common example of this kind of chart 
pattern is the “Head and Shoulders Pattern”，which is essentially created when a security's price
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has a pattern of three peaks. The middle peak (the head) is higher than the other two (the left and 
right shoulders), as indicated in Figure 2.3. The chart on the left is a standard head and shoulders 
pattern, while the chart to the right depicts an inverse head and shoulders pattern. The latter is 
simply a mirror image of the former.
Figure 2.3 Head and Shoulders Pattern
Technical analysis largely assumes that prices follow predictable trends, but if markets 
weak form efficient, technical analysis cannot consistently predict price changes (Bodic, 
Kane & Marcus, 2009). Data on past stock prices is publicly available and costs virtually nothing 
to attain. If this data really did display reliable indicators of future performances for stocks, 
investors will have already found out about them and used them to their advantage. Thus, these 
indicators lose their value as they become widely known because they have already resulted in a 
change in the price of the security. Furthermore, a market that is weak form efficient only 
includes past information and data, the same data used in technical analysis. But if it's impossible 
to beat the market using only past information, then technical analysis essentially doesn't work 
and is virtually pointless (for someone trying to beat the market).
Fundamental analysis is the type of security analysis often associated with semi-strong 
EMH, and differs from technical analysis in that it involves research that analyzes financial, 
economic, and accounting information in order to choose “undervalued” stocks and predict stock
are
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price changes (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). This includes determinants such as dividend and 
earnings prospects, expectations for future interest rates, risk of the firm, and financial ratios 
such as the price-to-eamings ratio (Bodie，Kane & Marcus, 2009).
Fundamental analysis assumes that “stock prices should be equal to the discounted value 
of the expected future cash flows the stock is expected to provide to its investors” (Bodie, Kane 
& Marcus, 2009)，，Thus, fundamental analysis is the “art” of identifying over- and undervalued 
securities based on analysis of the company's past financial statements as well as its future 
prospects. But again, as seen with technical analysis, how can fundamental analysis consistently 
be able to predict price changes if the markets are weak or semi-strong form efficient? It can't 
because investors have such easy access to this information, and will have already factored this 
information into the security's price. Furthermore, markets that are semi-strong only look at past 
and present information, and if it's impossible to beat the market using only this information, 
then fundamental analysis is essentially useless. Thus, neither fundamental analysis nor technical 
analysis can be expected to ensure success for any investor if markets are presumed to be 
efficient.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
EMH holds a number of assumptions as to how securities are priced, and the Capital 
developed to further address these assumptions. One of the 
fundamental questions in finance is how an investment’s risk affects its expected return. In the 
1950s, Harry Markowitz developed what became known as portfolio theory, wherein he looked 
at how investment returns can be optimized (Econlib). Bringing to mind the expression “don't 
put all your eggs in one basket”，he focused on diversification (investing in a variety of assets in 
order to reduce risk) and wrote that risks that are not correlated with one another are the ones that 
work best together; on the other hand, investments that move together- i.e. are strongly correlated 
with one another- are riskier to hold together in a portfolio (Crovitzf, 2008).
Asset Pricing Model was
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In 1990, Markowitz won the Nobel Prize in Economics for this theory and his 
contributions to the field of finance. One of his contributions was the Markowitz Efficient 
Frontier, depicted below.
Figure 2.4 Markowitz Efficient Frontier
£(0
CML
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The Efficient Frontier is a graphic portrayal of a set of possible portfolios that have a maximum 
return with a certain level of risk (Nasdaq). The hyperbola is the efficient frontier, while the 
straight line is the Capital Market Line, used to portray the rates of return for portfolios (E(r)) 
based on a given risk-free rate of return (rf) and the level of risk for the portfolio itself (om). The 
CML begins at the risk-free rate and goes through a portfolio on the efficient frontier 
(Schulmerich, 2012). Its point of tangency (Point M) represents the market portfolio, which 
“contains all securities, and the proportion of each security is its market value as a percentage of 
total market value”. Thus, E(rM) is the expected return for the market portfolio, My given the risk­
free rate and the risk of the portfolio.
That same year, William Sharpe shared the Nobel Prize with Markowitz for his own 
pioneering in financial economics which was through the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a model 
that draws on Markowitz's portfolio theory.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth referred to as the CAPM) was developed as 
a framework for answering the question of how securities are priced, and more specifically, how 
investment risks affect returns (Perold, 2004). It expands on Markowitz's model of explaining 
how risks affect returns in that it looks at one specific risk associated with returns. Developed by
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William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965), it has become the centerpiece of finance, 
leading several authors to suggest that its development marked the birth of asset pricing models 
(Fama & French, 2004). Prior to its development, in the 1940s and 50s, risk did not enter directly 
into the cost of capital's computation- a.k.a. the return investors would require of an asset 
(Perold, 2004). The CAPM gives insight into what kind of risk is related to return.
CAPM implies that assets can only earn a higher return if they have a higher market beta 
(a measure of how risky/volatile the asset is relative to that of the market), and is based on the 
idea that not all risks should affect an asset's price (Bhatnagar & Ramlogen, 2009). More 
specifically, asset-specific risk (risk that is specific to a certain asset or firm, also known as 
unsystematic risk) is not really a risk at all because it can be diversified away by other assets 
being held in a portfolio (Perold, 2004). In equilibrium, an asset's expected return is given by:
(2.2)E(ra) = rf+Ba (E(rm)-rf)
wherein E(ra) is the expected return of an asset, rf is the risk-free rate, Ba is the beta (risk 
measure) of the asset, and E(rm) is the expected market return.
The most important component of this equation is the beta, because as aforementioned, 
according to the CAPM, it is the only relevant risk to an investor. It relates individual stock 
return to the overall market return by looking at the correlation between the two returns. Thus, a 
beta greater than 1 means that the stock's return is more volatile (risky) than that of the market, 
and that the stock has greater non-diVersifiable risk. For example, a stock with a beta of 1.7 is 
essentially 70% more risky than the market.
The model assumes a linear relationship between a stock's expected return and the beta of 
the stock (Bhatnagar & Ramlogen, 2009). Beta essentially drives higher returns because of the 
risk-return tradeoff. Higher risk generates higher returns because the only way to generate higher 
returns is to subject your money to the possibility of it being lost; with high volatility comes the 
greater potential for a higher return. Thus, a higher beta equals a higher expected return.
2.5 Assumptions and Resulting Conditions of the CAPM
There arc a number of assumptions of the CAPM that should be noted. Firstly, it assumes 
that all investors are risk-averse, meaning that they dislike uncertainty and are prone to invest in
13 |K enna
assets associated with less risk (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). Additionally, the model assumes 
that investors have consistent expectations with regards to expected returns, variances, and
one-period horizon, and are wealth-maximizers. Furthermore, 
securities are infinitely divisible, so investors can buy any fraction of a share in a company. The 
capital markets are perfect so there are no taxes, transactions costs, or restrictions on short- 
selling any asset. Information is freely and instantaneously accessible to all investors (Bodie, 
Kane & Marcus, 2009).
Further assumptions include that there are many investors in these perfect capital markets 
and they behave competitively (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). They are price takers who act as 
if their actions do not affect prices, and no one investor can move the market. These investors 
can also borrow or lend any unlimited amounts at the same risk-free rate, and are rational mean- 
optimizers, meaning that they only care about expected returns and the variance of 
portfolio returns (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009). All investors have the same equal access to all 
securities and investing opportunities. Finally, through all of this, there is only one risk factor 
that is common to all securities, and that is the beta.
If these assumptions hold, they lead to the following equilibrium condition: all investors 
will hold the same portfolio for risky assets, which is the market portfolio (Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus, 2009). As aforementioned, this market portfolio contains all securities, and the 
proportion of each security is its market value as a percentage of total market value.
Many of these assumptions can be directly related to the assumptions of EMH. The 
CAPM assumes that information is available to investors both freely and instantaneously, a core 
assumption of EMH and the basis for the further assumption that assets all have this information 
accurately reflected in their prices. EMH also assumes that investors are rational, similar to the 
way in which the CAPM assumes investors are rational through their risk-aversity and wealth- 
maximizing expectations.
correlations over the same
variance
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Table 2.1 compares the assumptions of the CAPM to the assumptions of EMH. 
Table 2.1 The Assumptions of EMH and the CAPM
Assumptions of the CAPMAssumptions of EMH
> All investors are risk-averse.
> Markets operate efficiently (prices 
accurately and instantaneously reflect all 
available information.)
> All investors have consistent expectations 
with regards to expected returns, 
variances, and correlations over the same 
one-period horizon.
> All investors are wealth-maximizers.
> Investors can buy any fraction of a share in 
a company (securities are infinitely 
divisible). They can also short any asset.
> Investors can borrow or lend any unlimited 
amounts at the same risk-free rate.
> Securities markets are efficient, reflecting 
information about the market as well as 
about individual stocks.
> Information is available to investors both 
instantaneously and freely.
> All available information is accurately and 
instantaneously factored into securities’ 
prices.
> Changes in security prices are due only to 
sensible information.
> Deviations from equilibrium will not last 
long.
> People as economic agents are rational, 
efficient, and unbiased processors of 
relevant information.
> Investors make decisions that will 
maximize their utility.
> Investors behave competitively, thereby 
eliminating any unexploited profit 
opportunities.
> Investors cannot beat the market.
> Bubbles cannot occur/form.
> Information is freely and instantaneously 
accessible to all investors.
> There are many investors and they behave 
competitively: individual investors are 
price takers (they act as if their actions do 
not affect prices; no individual investor 
can move the market).
> All investors are looking ahead over the 
same single-period investment horizon 
(one identical holding period).
> There is only one risk factor common to 
all securities: the beta.
> Investors are rational mean-variance 
optimizers (only caring about expected 
returns and variance of portfolio returns).
> There are no taxes or transaction costs (no 
income taxes, fees or commissions).
> All investors have equal access to all 
securities.
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There are certain implications to be considered here. EMH can be violated without necessarily 
violating the CAPM, and vice versa. On the other hand, both can be violated simultaneously. For 
example, empirical evidence showing that investors are irrational would violate both EMH and 
the CAPM, as EMH is essentially the basis for the CAPM. Evidence that markets are not 
efficient, and that security prices do not reflect information accurately and instantaneously would 
also violate both. On the other hand, evidence suggesting violations of the CAPM’s assumption 
that investors can buy any fraction of a share in a company or can borrow or lend any unlimited 
amounts at the same risk-free rate would not violate EMH, as it does nothing to imply that 
investors are irrational, or that markets are inefficient.
Overall, both EMH and the CAPM rely on rational investors. Furthermore, EMH is 
essentially at the heart of the CAPM, as one of the major assumptions of the CAPM is that 
markets operate efficiently. That is, in an efficient capital market, security prices accurately 
reflect their long-term intrinsic values. This means that all systematic risk factors are captured by 
market movement, thereby leaving market risk as the only relevant risk，that investors require 
compensation for.
2.6 Implications of the CAPM
In addition to its assumptions, the CAPM also has a number of important implications. 
Perhaps most striking about the model is not that an asset's expected return depends on the asset's 
beta, but what an asset's expected return does not depend on. More specifically, a stock's 
expected return depends so much on its beta, while the stock's stand-alone risk (the risk 
associated with a single asset, independent of external factors) hardly has an effect on the stock's 
expected return (Fama & French, 2004). It's true that a portion of the stock's stand-alone risk is 
determined by its beta, thus leading to higher beta stocks having higher stand-alone risks. 
However, a stock does not need to have a high beta to have a high stand-alone risk; its stand­
alone risk can be high all on its own, depending on the stock's sensitivity to the market 
Therefore, the CAPM implies that stocks with higher stand-alone risks will have higher returns 
to the extent that their stand-alone risk is derived from their sensitivity to the broad market. In 
other words, the CAPM holds that an asset will have a higher expected return if it has a higher 
beta. Beta in part determines an asset’s stand-alone risk. Thus, an asset whose stand-alone risk is
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largely made up by beta will have a higher return the higher its stand-alone risk is (Fama & 
French, 2004).
Another implication of the CAPM is that the expected return of a stock is not dependent 
on the growth rate of its expected future cash flows (Fama & French, 2004). Thus, doing 
extensive analysis on a company's financial statements or attempting to forecast its future cash 
flows is unnecessary when trying to find the expected return on a stock. The fiindamental 
analysis aforementioned in relation to EMH is unneeded since, according to the CAPM, all we 
need to know about a company is the beta of its shares. The CAPM, then, simplifies the process 
of estimating an asset's expected returns, especially because this parameter is also arguably easier 
to estimate than a firm's expected future cash flows.
2.7 Empirical Evidence Challenging the CAPM
Beginning in the late 1970s, empirical work began to appear that challenged the CAPM 
model, even after tests for the Sharpe-Lintner model (the linear model based on the idea that an 
asset's expected return depends only on beta), as well as tests for the later Black model (a version 
of the CAPM without risk-free borrowing or lending which shows that results for the CAPM can 
be found by allowing unrestricted short sales of risky assets), showed that these were successful 
models (Fama & French, 2004). More specifically, evidence depicts that much of the variation in 
expected return is unrelated to the market beta.
The first critique was Basu's evidence in 1997, also known as the P/E effect. Basu's 
studies ultimately showed that portfolios and stocks with lower price-to-eamings ratios had 
higher returns than portfolios and stocks with higher price-earnings ratios. In 1981, Banz 
documented a difference in returns based on size in market capitalization (the stock's prices 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding): average returns on smaller cap companies were 
higher than predicted by CAPM. In 1988, Bhandari found that companies with high debt-to- 
equity ratios (which measure a compan/s leverage) are associated with returns too high relative 
to their betas. Finally, Statman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) found that high 
market-to-book stocks had high average returns not captured by their betas.
There is a common theme to be found in the studies mentioned above. It appears that 
ratios involving stock prices have information about expected returns that is missed by the
17 | K e n n a
market betas. Thus, these ratios expose the shortcomings to be found in some pricing models- in 
this case with the CAPM- and defects in the assumption that market betas are enough to predict 
expected returns. As shown in the contradictions referenced above, the P/E, debt-to-equity, and 
market-to-book ratios are examples of such ratios.
In 1992, Fama and French came on board with the biggest assaults on the CAPM. Using 
cross-sectional data, they confirmed that size, P/E, debt-to-equity, and market-to-book ratios 
indeed all add to the explanation of expected returns made by the market beta. Later in 1996, 
they reached the same conclusions using time-series data applied to portfolios with stocks sorted 
by price ratios, with the conclusion that price ratios are just more dependable than systematic 
risk. Their conclusions also showed that different price ratios have much of the same information 
about expected returns, not surprising as price is the driving force behind price ratios.
More recent studies have examined and brought evidence against the validity of the 
CAPM. Huang (2000) conducted a study covering 93 firms over an eight-year period and using 
two different sets: high-risk and low-risk. He found that high-risk sets conflict with the CAPM 
while low-risk sets are more consistent with the model, thereby concluding that the CAPM is 
invalid as it does not interpret the actual position of the return and is thus unreliable. Other 
studies, such as Scheicher (2000) documented results that simply show that other multi-risk 
factor models yield better results than the CAPM. Fraser and Hamelink (2004) showed that while 
the CAPM is seemingly accurate, more accurate tools like APT (arbitrage pricing theory) 
outperform it over time.
Overall, though results are mixed, there is much evidence that favors the inapplicability 
and invalidity of the CAPM, at least in its original form. It was Fama and French's findings that 
served as the catalyst towards acknowledging that the CAPM has some fatal problems. CAPM’s 
reliance on a single measure of risk- that is, beta- ignores any other factors that contribute to the 
price of a security.
The CAPM will now be tested using data from the portfolio of the Redlands Student 
Investment Fund. If the test is successful, it will support the hypothesis that the CAPM may not 
be empirically valid, at least with regards to application for RSIF. If the test is unsuccessful, it 
will suggest that the CAPM is indeed a sound model for pricing securities and their returns 
(again, with respect to RSIF and the Fund's portfolio).
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III. Data Explanation and Models
The first empirical tests of the CAPM were based on studies by John Lintner (1965). 
Using data of stock and market returns over a five-year period, he ran a first-pass regression 
(also known as time-series regression) to estimate the betas of each stock. These were found by 
regressing the risk premiums of various securities against the market risk premium (the 
difference between a market portfolio’s expected return and the risk-free rate). A second-pass 
regression was then run, a cross-sectional regression of portfolio returns on betas. His results 
implied that a stock with a beta of zero had a higher return than the Treasury Bill rate, which 
should not be the case. Rather, a stock with a beta of zero should have the same return as the 
Treasury Bill rate since this is also a risk-free rate. His results further implied that investors 
required compensation for firm-specific risk, while according to the CAPM, the beta is the only 
measure of risk that matters and should be compensated for. (The difference between the two is 
that while firm-specific risk is risk specific to the company itself irrespective of any external 
factors, beta looks at the risk of the company relative to the market.) Thus, Lintner's results failed 
to coincide with predictions of the CAPM, suggesting it may not be an empirically valid model.
For this paper, Lintner's same process of first- and second-pass regressions will be used 
for the purposes of testing the CAPM. The null and alternative hypotheses arc as follows:
Ho = The CAPM is empirically valid.
Hi = The CAPM is not empirically valid.
For gathering the data to be used in the tests, the stocks to be used will be the stocks held by the 
Redlands Student Investment Fund (RSIF). RSIF was formed around 2007-2008, a student-run 
club managing a mock portfolio to familiarize students with investment strategies and the 
markets. After about three years of managing just a mock portfolio, the family of the club's 
faculty adviser felt so strongly about the need for RSIF to manage real funds, and made a 
donation of $10,000. Another contribution of $10,000 was made by Capital Group Foundation, 
after which the Board of Trustees matched these contributions, giving RSIF a total of $40,000 for 
investing in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc. Stocks are chosen based on students' interests and 
how strongly they feel about a company. Presentations are made to the club, incorporating a 
combination of technical and fundamental analysis to value the company, after which any
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proposed investment is voted upon by the analysts (members with voting rights) of the club.
The stocks used from RSIF's portfolio for the purposes of testing the CAPM are 
follows: Apple Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co” General Electric Company, United Parcel Service, 
Inc., BP pic, SPDR S&P 500, Rogers Corporation, The Coca-Cola Company, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals Industries Limited, Caterpillar Inc., Target Corp., Panera Bread Co., 
International Business Machines Corporation, Chesapeake Energy Corporation, and Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. (B shares).
Not all stocks in the portfolio will be used because of a lack of data for certain stocks; 
that is to say, some stocks have only had their initial public offerings (IPOs) in the past few 
years, so the insufficient amount of historical data makes it impossible to collect monthly returns 
adequate time span. Thus, data from a total of fifteen stocks will be used to run the 
regressions. Stocks not included in the regression analysis include Qlik Technologies (IPO in 
August 2010) and Silver Wheaton Corp. (July 2005).
Because of the small sample size, the data to be collected for the regressions will cover a 
ten-year time period, for a total of 120 monthly returns (as opposed to the five-year/sixty 
monthly returns used by Lintner in his tests). The time period will range from October 2002 to 
(and inclusive of) September 2012.
The model for the first-run (time-series) regression will take the following form (also 
known as the firm's Security Characteristic Line):
as
over an
SCL: Ri-t- Rf= (Xj + Pi(RM,t - Rf) + Gi,t (3.1)
wherein Ry is the monthly return of the security for time tt Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm,i is the 
monthly return of the market, fij is the slope of the line (and the risk of the security at time t), a is 
the intercept (and the rate of return in excess of the risk-free rate), and C,- is simply stochastic 
error. According to the CAPM, if the securities market is efficient, alpha should be equal to zero. 
The beta (Pi) will be equal to the estimated volatility of the stock relative to the market.
As aforementioned, the monthly return for each security will cover the time period 
October 2002 to September 2012. The site YahoolFinance will be used to find this historical 
data. Since 'market' refers to all securities, the expected market return (Rm.0 can be the average
return of an index fund over a specified period of time— for example, a proxy from the DOW or
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the Russell 1000 index. For the purposes of this paper, the S&P 500 will be used as a proxy, and 
the data for this will also be drawn from YahooIFinance. The S&P 500 was chosen as the proxy 
for the regressions because it is based on the market capitalizations of the top 500 companies in 
the U.S., while the Dow only includes the leading 30 companies. Finally, the risk free rate (Rf) is 
normally a 10-year government bond yield, so data will be drawn from the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin on 10-year Treasury rates.
For each regression of the first model, the security's estimated beta will be collected for 
use in the second-pass (cross-sectional) regression. Also for use in the second-pass regression, 
the average return of each security and the estimated variance of each security's residuals will be 
collected. The model for this regression takes the following form:
rrrf=Yo + Yifl! + + m (3.2)
wherin rj-rf is risk premium of the security, 8| is the security's beta estimated from the first 
regression, a2 is the estimated variance of the security's residuals, and 叫 is again some form of
stochastic error. If the CAPM is correct, y0 should be equal to zero since it represents the stock's
return with respect to the Treasury Bill rate, y, is the security risk premium, and thus should be
equal to Rm,i - Rf. Finally, 丫2 should be equal to zero, as it represents the compensation required
by investors for firm-specific risk. (Firm-specific risk should not matter because, according to 
the CAPM, beta is the only important measure of risk.)
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IV. Regression Results and Analysis
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics
P/E RatioMarket 
Capitalization 
(in billions)
Average
Monthly
Return
Sector/ IndustryCompany Name Ticker
Symbol
N/AN/A0.50%N/AXJSPCS&P500
N/AN/A3.71%N/AN/ATreasury Rates
9.93$411.183.82%Technology- Personal 
Computers
AAPLApple Inc.
9.711921.19%Financial-
Money Center Banks
JPMJP Morgan Chase & Co.
18.28245.6Industrial Goods- Diversified 
Machinery
0.54%General Electric 
Company
GE
102.280.740.52%Services-
Air Delivery and Freight 
Services
United Parcel Service, UPS
Inc.
11.20.75% 129.38Basic Materials- 
Major Integrated Oil and Gas
British Petroleum (BP BP
pic)
N/A 140.67%N/ASPDR S&P 500 SPY
12.111.16% 0.83Consumer Goods- Rubber 
and Plastic
Rogers Corporation ROG
0.26% 175.19 19.95Consumer Goods- 
Beverages- Soft Drinks
The Coca-Cola 
Company
KO
17.89Teva Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Limited
Healthcare- Drug 
Manufacturers- Other
0.11% 34.49TEVA
Caterpillar Inc. Industrial Goods- Farm and 
Construction Machinery
1.41% 59.73 10.75CAT
Target Corp. TGT Services, Discount, Variety 
Stores
0.98% 43.45 14.9
5anera Bread Co. PNRA Services- Specialty Eatery 1.82% 4.79 27.87
ntemational Business 
Machines
Technology- Diversified 
Computer Systems
IBM 1.09% 234.14 14.62
Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation
CHK Basic Materials- Independent 
Oil and Gas
1.60% 13.85 N/A
Berkshire Hathaway 
Inc. (B shares)
BRK-B N/A -0.33% 0.17 0.01
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Table 4.1 lists some summary statistics for each of the stocks used in the data analysis, including 
the ticker symbols under which they’re listed on their respective stock exchanges, the sector and 
industry they fall into, their average monthly returns, their, market capitalizations, and their 
price-eamings ratios. All information has been taken from Yahoo!Finance.
Model 1
As aforementioned, regression analysis was run in Stata in order to test the CAPM, but 
before any regressions could be run, a few steps had to be taken. First, in order to use and take 
advantage of Stata's time series commands, the data had to be declared as time series data. After 
this, two-way time series line (tsline) graphs were generated in order to give 
representation of the data over time. Of the fifteen stock variables, only one had a graph that 
stood out significantly. As shown below, Berkshire Hathaway took a huge hit right before the 
beginning of 2010, largely due to its acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which 
involved a 50-1 stock split of its B shares in order to help finance the acquisition.
Figure 4.1 TSLine Graph for Berkshire Hathaway
visuala
5
2002ml 2004ml 2006m1 2008ml 2010m1 2012m1
Ume
The rest of the fifteen stocks took hits mainly around this time due to the recession, or in the 
early 2000s because of the tech bubble, but none as extreme as that shown in Berkshire 
Hathaway's shares above. This could throw oflE^ affect some of the numbers necessary for the 
regression analysis, such as the average monthly return.
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After the tsline graphs were drawn, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were run for each of 
the variables in order to test whether there were any unit roots present in the data (i.e. to see 
whether each time-series variable is stationary or not). Unit root tests analyze whether a variable 
is stationary or not. The results are shown Table 4.2:
Table 4.2 Unit Root Test Results
DFULLERVARIABLE
•8.442*** 
■9.703*** 
-10.986… 
-9.683*** 
-11.088*** 
•10.778… 
-11.128*** 
-8.451***
■7929…
-9.830***
•10.669…
-11.333***
-11.050***
-9.978…
-9.640***
•10.836***
rsp500rf
raaplrf
rjpmrf
rgerf
rupsrf
rbprf
rspyrf
rrogrf
rkorf
rtevarf
rcatrf
rtgtrf
rpnrarf
ribmrf
rchkrf
rbrkbrf
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Each variable was tested against a 1% critical value of -3.504, a 5% critical value of -2.889, and 
a 10% critical value of -2.579. As seen in the high negative t-statistics above, we can reject any 
hypothesis of the data having unit roots at the 1，5, and 10% levels of significance.
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Regression analysis was then run on each variable against the S&P500 index，in order to 
estimate the betas of each stock.
The results from Model 1 (SCL: Ri,卜 Rf = aj + pi(RM，t 一 Rf) + €“t) are as follows:
Table 4.3 Model 1 - Regression Output
W⑺⑹(5)(4)⑶(2)⑴ Coca-ColaRogersS&P 500 
Index
BPUPSGEJPMorganAppleVARIABLE
-0.465
(0.311)
-0.0795+**
(0.0170)
0.2811.329*** 1.425*** 0.851*** 0.338** -0.189
(0.139) (0.110) (0.0924) (0.134) (0.155)
0.0175** 0.0140** -0.00462 0.0109 -0.0390***
(0.00759) (0.00602) (0.00505) (0.00731) (0.00849)
1.213*** 
(0.207) 
0.0399… 
(0.0113)
rsp500rf
(0.217) 
0.0424… 
(0.0119)
Constant
120120120120120120120 120Observations
R-squared 0.0190.0140.0120.437 0.587 0.418 0.0510.225
Standard errors in parentheses
p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.3 (continued)
(15)(14)(13)(12)00) (11) 
Caterpillar Target
(9)
IBM Chesapeake Berkshire 
Hathaway
Panera
Bread
VARIABLE Teva
0.734***
(0.200)
•0.0169
(0.0110)
1.107•㈣ 
(0.210) 
0.0144 
(0.0115)
0.781***
(0.0898)
-0.00120
(0.00491)
0.965… 
(0.178) 
0.0120 
(0.00975)
0.665… 
(0.177) 
-0.0147 
(0.00966)
1.671*** -0.0799
(0.167) (0.259)
0.0306*** -0.0139 
(0.00911) (0.0142)
rsp500rf
Constant
120 120120 120Observations
R-squared
120 120 120
0.1020.390 0.1900.1990.107 0.460 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.01,**p<0.05, *p<0.1
After each variable's regression analysis was run, tests were run for heteroskedasticity, 
serial correlation, arch effects, and omitted variables. Heteroskedasticity is a violation of 
Classical Assumption V，which states that the observations of the error term are drawn from a 
distribution that has a constant variance. This creates a problem because it won’t cause bias in 
the coefficient estimates, but it will cause the estimates to no longer be minimum variance. Serial 
correlation is a violation of Classical Assumption IV that different observations of the error terms
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uncorrelated with each other. It presents a problem in very much the same way that 
heteroskedasticity does: while it doesn't cause bias in the estimated coefficients, it does cause our 
estimator (Ordinary Least Squares) to no longer be minimum variance. Testing for arch effects is 
necessary to investigate autocorrelation and time-varying volatility in the data. Finally, omitted 
variables are a problem as this can lead to biased estimates.
Five tests were run for each variable: a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity, a Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation, a Ramsey REST test for omitted 
variables, a Brcusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, and finally an Arch LM test for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.
For the most part, no negative results came back for the tests. However, some of the 
Breusch -Pagan tests suggested heteroskedasticity in a few of the variables, as shown in the high 
chi2 stats below:
are
Table 4.4 Breusch-Pagan Results for Heteroskedasticicy (HETTEST)
2CHIVARIABLE
23.36JP Morgan 
Rogers Corp. 
Teva 
IBM
Berkshire
Hathaway
11.78
40.59
18.38
45.93
Additionally, Breusch-Godfrey LM tests indicated signs of autocorrelation for Coca-Cola, as 
indicated in the following chart:
Table 4.5 Breusch-Godfrey Results for Autocorrelation
2VARIABLE CHI
Coca-Cola 10.698
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In order to correct for each of the above variables' violations of Ordinary Least Squares' (OLS) 
Classical Assumptions, their regressions were re-run, this time using Robust Standard Errors 
(which takes into account serial correlation without actually changing the betas themselves) *- 
Once this was done with Model 2 (n-rf=丫。+ Yifli + 72^(60 + ^i), the new estimated coefficients 
were as follows:
Table 4.6 Model 1 - Regression Output (After Corrections with Robust Standard Errors)
⑹ ⑻(4) (5) ⑺0) (2) (3)
S&P 500 Rogers 
Index
Coca-ColaApple UPS BPVARIABLE JP GE
Morgan
1.329*** 1.425*** 0.851*** 0.338** -0.189
(0.209) (0.110) (0.120) (0.134) (0.155) (0.250)
0.0175** 0.0140** -0.00462 0.0109 -0.0390*** 0.0424***
(0.00696) (0.00602) (0.00470) (0.00731) (0.00849) (0.00988)
-0.465 
(0.306) 
-0.0795… 
(0.0165)
rsp500rf 1.213***
(0.207)
0.0399***
(0.0113)
0.281
Constant
120 120120 120Observations
R-squared
120120 120 120
0.0190.012 0.0140.437 0.587 0.418 0.0510.225
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6 (continued)
(14) (15)(11) 02) (13)
Target Panera
Bread
(9) (10)
IBM Chesapeake Berkshire 
Hathaway
CaterpillarVARIABLE Teva
1.107***
(0.210)
0.0144
(0.0115)
0.734***
(a.206)
-0.0169… 
(0.00476)
-0.0799 0.965*_ 0.781***
(0.259) (0.178) (0.113)
•0.0139 0.0120 -0.00120
(0.0142) (0.00975) (0.00404)
rsp500rf 0.665… 
(0.216) 
-0.0147** 
(0.00600)
1.671***
(0.167)
0.0306***
(0.00911)
Constant
120 120120 120Observations
R-squared
120 120 120
0.001 0.199 0.390 0.190 0.1020.107 0.460
Standard errors in parentheses
p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
There were little to no changes to be seen in either the estimated betas or the t-statistics once this 
was all done. After each regression, the residuals for each regression were predicted and saved, 
as the estimated variance of variables，residuals will be necessary for the second-pass (cross- 
sectional) regression in Model 2.
’ Correcting the estimator (OLS) by using Weighted Least Squares would have been a more appropriate method of correcting for the violations 
made to the OLS Classical Assumption since the sample size is so small, but Robust Standard Errors was use for this paper.______________
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These variances came out as follows:
Table 4.7 Estimated Variances of the Residuals
VARIABLE ESTIMATED VARIANCE
OF THE RESIDUALS
Apple 
JP Morgan
0.0100
0.0045
0.0028
0.0020
0.0042
0.0056
0.0110
0.0226
0.0073
0.0065
0.0156
0.0074
0.0019
0.0103
0.0094
GE
UPS
BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Teva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
Model 2
In order to run the second-pass regression, it was necessary to collect the following data from 
each stock: the average security risk premium, n - rr, the estimated beta, Pi, and the estimated 
variance of the residuals, for the following equation:
yo + YiPi + Y2a2(e，) + W (4.1)ri-rf
Also needed was the average market risk premium, RM,t - Rf- The estimated betas for 
each security, and the estimated variances of the residuals have already been listed in this 
section. The average returns for each stock were also calculated for the regression. As mentioned 
earlier, if the CAPM is correct, the following should be true for Equation 4.1:
Yo=0___
y\ = rm - rf 
Y2 = 0and
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The regression results came back as follows:
Table 4.8 Model 2 - Regression Output
(1)
VARIABLES averageretum
beta 0.00117
(0.0124)
-0.522
(1.401)
-0.0185
(0.0189)
estimatedvarianceoftheresiduals
Constant
Observations
R-squared
15
0.023
Standard errors in parentheses
孝幸串 p<0.01，**p<0.05，*p<0.1
Afterwards, the data was tested for violations of the OLS Classical Assumptions, but there were 
no negative results that had to be corrected for. Thus, with the estimated coefficients, the model 
looks as such:
(4.2)y = -.018542 -.0011727 yi - .5218833 y2+W
The final step was to test whether each of these coefficients were statistically significant. 
A joint hypothesis test was used with the goal of rejecting the null hypotheses that the constant 
isn’t statistically significant from zero, the coefficient for the security betas is equal to the 
average return of the market of -0.032085, and the beta of the estimated variances of the 
residuals isn’t statistically significant from zero. The tests returned the following results:
Table 4.9 Hypothesis Test Results
Conditions Tested Jointly Prob > F
Estimatedvarianceoflher 
esiduals = 0
con = 0 0.0297**
Besta = -0.032085
p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1***
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As mentioned numerous times already, the constant and the coefficient on the estimated 
variances of the residuals should be equal to zero in order for the CAPM to hold. The constant 
should be equal to zero because it is a measure of the return of a stock with a beta of zero, and 
such a stock should not have a higher return than the Treasury Bill rate because that rate is also 
risk-free. The estimated variance of the residuals should also be equal to zero because it 
the unsystematic risk premium. Any measure higher than zero would indicate that 
investors require compensation for firm-specific risk, a risk measure that the CAPM does not 
take into account. Based on the results in Table 4.11, we can conclude that, at least at a 5% and 
10% level of significance, we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly the constant is not 
statistically significant from zero, the coefficient for the security betas is equal to the average 
return of the market of -0.032085, and the beta of the estimated variances of the residuals is not 
statistically significant from zero.
Thus, the results indicate that there is the chance of investors earning a return different, 
and possibly higher, than that of the market. The study shows that the CAPM may not hold, at 
least as far as application to RSIF’s portfolio goes. The reason for this may be that, as mentioned 
numerous times, the CAPM’s and EMH’s assumptions may not hold.
It’s important to note that this is not the only reason the CAPM may not hold. There are 
other reasons, namely that the CAPM only takes a security’s beta into account when assessing 
expected return. There may be other factors the model is leaving out, and studies have been done 
that have come up with extensions to the CAPM model in the form of multi-factor models in 
order to account for this possibility. For example, Fama and French (2004) came up with a 
version of the CAPM that takes into account market capitalization (size and value). Black (1972) 
developed a model that has no risk-free borrowing or lending, and Litzcnberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979) developed one that takes into account dividends and taxes. •
These, and many other extensions, to the CAPM have been developed in attempts to 
correct for the anomalies of the CAPM. For this paper however, further studies, in the form of a 
second literature review, will be done in attempts to explain why the CAPM may not hold 
because its assumptions- and those of EMH- do not hold.
measures
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V. Explanations through Behavioral Finance
The CAPM model can be linked to EMH because of the similar assumptions that each 
asserts, namely that both assume markets to be efficient and investors to be rational. Thus, EMH 
is arguably and essentially at the heart of the CAPM model, though it’s important to recall that 
the model can be rejected without simultaneously rejecting EMH. To recap, the CAPM 
that information is available to investors both freely and instantaneously, a core assumption of 
EMH and the basis for the further assumption that assets all have this information accurately 
reflected in their prices. EMH also assumes that investors are rational, similar to the way in 
which the CAPM assumes investors are rational through their risk-aversity and wealth- 
maximizing expectation. Therefore, perhaps the reason that the CAPM so often does not hold 
empirically valid model is because markets are not efficient. Though this is not the only 
possible reason that CAPM doesn’t hold (for example, the CAPM may not hold because it is a 
linear model that accounts for only one type of risk), it is the argument that this paper will 
attempt to support through further studies described in this section on behavioral finance.
John Maynard Keynes had one of the earliest explanations for securities being priced the 
way they are, suggesting in Chapter 12 of his “General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money” that stock prices are based more on speculation rather than economic fundamentals. This 
state of long-term expectation is based partly on future events that can only be forecasted with 
more or less confidence (Keynes, 1935).
For simplicity^ sake for linking behavioral finance- and the ways investors make 
decisions- to EMH, we'll summarize EMH by using Andrew Shleifer’s argument for the three 
conditions that will cause/lead to market efficiency. The first is that all investors are rational. The 
second is that even when investors sometimes independently display irrational optimism or 
pessimism over new information (thus affecting the price of a security accordingly), the 
countervailing irrationalities would cancel each other out. Thirdly, arbitrage is not possible in 
efficient markets, and even if it is present, the arbitrage activities of professionals will only 
dominate the speculation of amateurs, thus keeping the market efficient.
If any one of the aforementioned conditions holds, markets will be efficient. However, 
many members of the academic community, including Shleifer himself, have argued that none of
assumes
as
an
the three conditions is likely to hold in reality (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012). This argument
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is based on what has become known as the field of behavioral finance.
5.1 Introduction to Behavioral Finance
In 1951, O.K. Burrell, a professor at the University of Oregon, published an article titled 
“Possibility of an Experimental Approach to Investment Studies.” Later in 1967, another Oregon 
professor, W. Scott Bauman, followed with an article titled “Scientific Investment Analysis: 
Science or Fiction?” Both professors were calling for a new field of research, one that focused on 
and combined psychological research with finance research (Olsen, 1998). Interest in the field of 
behavioral finance, however, did not take off until the late 1980s, at which point a slew of 
professors were publishing research relevant to the field: Richard Thaler (University of Chicago), 
Howard Kunreuther (University of Pennsylvania), Robert Shiller (Yale), and Werner De Bondt 
(University of Wisconsin), to name a few. Interest in the field was spurred by two developments, 
the first being the large amounts of empirical evidence being heaped against existing financial 
theories that were now seeming to be fundamentally deficient; the second is the development of 
prospect theory (Olsen, 1998).
The field of behavioral finance essentially attempts to link human psychology with 
financial markets. Researchers began seeing too many anomalies in theoretical models (like the 
CAPM, for example), and developed the notion that perhaps investors aren't rational after all, but 
rather are subject to behavioral biases that in turn affect their decisions (Brooks & Byrne, 2008). 
As a science, behavioral finance begins by studying fundamental propositions, and questions 
whether a theory built on these propositions can explain the behavior of the financial 
marketplace. While it does not actually try to define what “rational” behavior is, it does attempt 
to understand and predict the implications of psychological decision processes on the financial 
market (Olsen, 1998). Furthermore, it focuses on principles of psychology and economics and 
their applications for the improvement of decision-making (Olsen, 1998).
5.2 Implications for Shleifer’s Three Conditions of EMH
As aforementioned, many, including Professor Shleifer himself, argued that none of his 
three conditions that can lead to market efficiency is likely to hold in reality. Behavioral finance 
attempts to explain why this may be the case. Take the first condition: rationality. Are people
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really rational? One can argue that they aren't by simply considering something as simple 
gambling at Las Vegas. Gambling isn't exactly a rational activity, as it is risky and has a negative 
expected return, and yet people do it anyway.
So it appears that people aren't rational in general, but what about investors in particular? 
How does this apply to financial markets? For one thing, investors don’t always achieve the 
degree of diversification that they should, thus not maximizing their potential for a higher return. 
Additionally, trading is not npn-taxable, so for every investor trading frequently to realize capital 
gains, they are also generating both commissions and taxes that they'll have to pay on those gains 
(Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012). In fact, taxes can be minimized by selling securities that are 
losers and holding on to ones that are winners (thus paying taxes on the smaller gains, rather than 
the larger ones). However, plenty of investors do quite the opposite and follow what has been 
termed as “prospect theory”，developed by Kahneman and Tversky. According to their studies, 
people weigh outcomes differently, and many investors are loss-averse, selling their winners and 
keeping their losers in attempts to minimize losses, but also leading to higher tax payments. 
Thus, according to behavioral finance, maybe not all, but many investors are irrational.
Shleifer's second condition to market efficiency refers to independent deviations from 
rationality. Are deviations from rationality generally random, thus more likely to cancel out in 
the population of investors? According to behavioral view, this isn't the case. Psychologists argue 
that people deviate from rationality in accordance with a number of basic principles, two of 
which appear to have a direct application to finance and market efficiency: representativeness 
and conservatism (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012).
In the case of representativeness, a person assesses a situations based on past features 
instead of the relevant probabilities (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012). In simpler terms, take the 
example of a gambler once again, this time at a roulette table. He bets on black because it has 
already occurred a number of consecutive times and he thinks that this streak will continue. 
Firstly, the logic is defective because the roulette tables have no memory. More importantly, 
there's an error in his strategy simply because the probability of a black result is still only fifty 
percent and hasn't increased just because of the streak. Thus, the person displays 
representativeness, wherein he or she draws conclusions from an insufficient amount of data. In 
other words, he or she applies the result of a smaller sample to an entire population in bigger
as
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ways than it really is. Take this and apply this to financial markets: displays of representativeness 
can be explanatory of bubbles. Investors might see a sector of the market doing well and growing 
at great rates, but once that growth peaks, prices drop (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012).
The second big psychological principle with which people deviate from rationality is 
conservatism: people are slow to adjust their beliefs in the face of new information that is made 
available, and instead cling to their initial beliefs (Ross, Westerfield, & JafFe, 2012). Consider 
person who has always wanted to go into the field of computer science, expecting to have a 
successful career ahead of him. Suppose a new kind of technology is invented, a machine that 
lowers the demand for people with computer science degrees and skills. Psychologically, a 
person with emotional attachment to the field of computer science may not be ready to accept the 
reality and implications of this new technology, and would instead cleave to his optimistic view 
of a future in this field. Now consider the relationship to financial markets. Studies have shown 
that prices are slow to account for new information reported in earnings announcements, 
meaning that perhaps investors are not quick to adjust to their beliefs based on this 
information. Say a company is floundering because of a lack of growth in the industry and 
demand for the company's products, or because of dramatic changes taking place in the industry. 
Investors who believe very strongly in this company may not be ready to admit that there is no 
future for this company.
Representativeness and conservatism are just two principles through which investors 
deviate from rationality. Studies have come across other biases in decision making that can be 
applied in a financial context: overconfidence and overoptimism, wherein investors put more 
weight on both their own abilities and the accuracy of the information they have; availability 
bias, wherein investors exaggerate the probabilities of recent events because it is still fresh in 
their memory; frame dependence and anchoring, wherein the decision made is affected by the 
way the information is presented to them; mental accounting, wherein investors ignore the 
effects of correlation or exchangeability and instead allocate wealth to different mental 
compartments; and regret aversion, wherein investors make their decisions so that they won’t 
regret them in the event that something later goes wrong (Brooks & Byrne, 2008).
The final of Shleifer's conditions for efficient markets is arbitrage. When arbitrage occurs 
in this sense, securities might be mispriced because of the emotions of amateurs, which would be
a
new
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duly noted by professionals who would buy the underpriced securities and sell their substitutes 
(assumed to be correctly- or overpriced), thus correcting the mispricing (Ross, Wcsterfield, & 
Jaffe, 2012). However, there's a very high amount of risk that comes with this kind of trading. 
For one thing, prices would only be able to adjust if the number of positions held by 
professionals is relatively large compared to those of amateurs. Thus, in a world of many 
amateurs, a small number of professionals have to take considerably large positions to bring 
prices to their accurate levels (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012). Any amount of bad news 
related to the mispriced stock, or good news related to the stock's substitutes, would lead to big 
losses for the professionals (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012). Additionally, if a security has 
been mispriced by amateurs today, what's to say it won’t be even more mispriced by them 
tomorrow?
Thus, to sum up, Shleifer's principles aren't likely to hold in reality. Investors may very 
well be irrational, irrationality may not cancel itself out across investors, and arbitrage strategies 
may be too risky to eliminate inefficiencies in the markets (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2012).
5.3 Behavioral Finance: Empirical Studies and Evidence
As aforementioned, behavioral finance focuses on the application of psychological and 
economic principles for improving decision making (Olsen, 1998). Table 5.1 gives a list of 
decision behaviors that have implications on the market. The implications of these behaviors on 
investing and the market are incomplete, but behavioral research has produced evidence that they 
contribute to a number of investment-related features: stock prices that are less than perfectly 
predictable, stock price volatility, bubbles, herding behavior among investors, over- or 
underestimation of loss risk, poor timing in transactions (selling winners too early, or vice versa), 
popular investments that perform poorer-than-expected/desired, investors assuming “good” 
companies are also good and/or safe investments, over- or underrreaction to new available 
information, and more (Olsen, 1998).
In a paper titled “Behavioral Finance and Its Implications for Stock-Price Volatility”， 
Robert Olsen asserted that “the potential explanatory value of behavioral finance may be seen by 
focusing on the volatile nature of stock prices”. The field provides explanations for the empirical 
evidence mounting against financial models that suggest they are complex and nonlinear.
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Noted in his book Fractal Market Analysis (1994)，Edgar Peters studied capital market 
returns by analyzing time-series data: 103 years of Dow Jones Industrial Average data. His 
conclusions were this: stock prices and returns are cyclical. In the short run, he found they are 
imperfectly predictable, and in the long run they are unpredictable altogether. Their behavior is 
nonlinear (contrary to what many financial models suggest) and is related to time-varying 
positive feedback. (Positive feedback occurs when securities' speculative prices go up, attracting 
attention and demand that spurs further increases in prices and expectations. Many times, such 
feedback leads to a speculative bubble that eventually bursts, as it is spurred by high expectations 
for further price increases- expectations that cannot be sustained forever) (Shiller, 2003).
Peters' observations can be connected to behavioral finance because, as Eve，Horsfall, and 
Lee noted in their book Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology (1997), this kind of nonlinear 
behavior is displayed in most complex social phenomena. Earlier studies by Baumol (1989), 
Richards (1990), and Sterman (1988) have shown that when it comes to individuals making 
economic decisions, the nature of that process offers many opportunities for positive feedback as 
well as nonlinear behavioral in securities' prices. For example, when investors are faced with 
making a complex decision, they tend to look at the stock price and changes in the price as value 
indicators. They also have a tendency to put more weight on recent events and the beliefs of the 
population, seek confirming evidence, believe that trends in the stock price will continue, and 
wish to be a part of the overall group. All of these things lead to the stock price increasing, i.e. 
positive feedback. Baumol also observed that, depending on how complex the situation is, 
investors will collectively focus on the same pieces of available information. All these things 
tend to amplify the effects of the positive feedback.
Empirical works have also shown that the more a decision is reversible and emotional, 
and the greater the time stress, the more intuitive the decision process will be. This leads to 
expectations of great price volatility for the given security. Edward Miller (1997) observed that a 
larger variation in opinion will lead to higher price volatility as well as higher equilibrium prices 
(unless of course arbitrage opportunities are employed).
Investor sentiment has also been studied to observe whether it has any effect on stock 
returns, though many in the field believe this is self-evident. Investor sentiment is a description 
of how investors feel about a stock: whether they are neutral, bullish (hopeful and optimistic), or
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bearish (believing the stock is about to fall) on the stock. Though Fisher and Statman (2000) 
found no evidence of a positive relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns in their 
studies of individual investors and the S&P 500, other recent studies have found quite the 
opposite. In 2006, Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler found that if sentiment is low, then the returns for 
a cross-section of stocks are subsequently high. These include small stocks, young stocks, high 
volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and 
distressed stocks. Kumar and Lee (2006) looked at retail investor sentiment, ultimately finding a 
role for it in the formation of returns. Tetlock (2007) observed the role of the media's influence 
on the stock market, concluding that high media pessimism leads to a temporary impact on 
returns that is later reversed. He also found a high trading volume in the market when media 
pessimism is either unusually high or low. Ultimately, all these works found evidence that high 
investor sentiment later leads to low returns, and vice versa.
Causes of investor sentiment and their activities can vary, and can sometimes be quite 
trivial. For example, Hirshleifer and Shurmway (2003) looked at twenty-six exchanges around 
the world and found that the weather can affect stock returns: sunlight affects a person's mood, 
which in turn affects how the individual assesses future prospects. Additionally, stock returns are 
negatively affected by cloudiness. Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi also had interesting findings that 
same year: by looking at stock market data over a number of countries, they found that investor 
sentiment, risk tolerance, and stock returns across countries are influenced by seasonal variation 
of daylight.
Another area of behavioral finance that has been the focus of many empirical studies is 
the under- and overreaction of investors to information on securities, and how these reactions 
affect the securities' prices. Studies such as those done by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and 
Debondt and Thaler (1985) found reversals in returns from a short-term to a long-term period. In 
the short term (lasting up to twelve months), there is initial underreaction to news in pricing 
securities, but in the long-run (three to five years), there is overreaction. Debondt and Thaler 
found that portfolios with stocks that were initially “losers” ended up outperforming those 
portfolios with “winners” in the long run, even though the winning stocks were much more risky.
These behavioral instances fall in violation of a theorem set forth in the eighteenth 
century by a mathematician named Thomas Bayes. Bayes' approach was a mathematical one
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which attempted to explain how one modifies his or her existing beliefs in light of new 
information (Murphy, 2000). In other words, one would combine new information to what they 
already know. Circumstances of under- or overreaction contradict this because under said 
circumstances people are focusing solely on new information rather than considering it in 
addition to their already existing knowledge.
The aforementioned empirical findings have presented a bit of a challenge for researchers 
in the behavioral field: a challenge of how to explain initial underreaction but long term 
overreaction in such a way that rebuts the view Eugene Fama made in his 1998 article “Market 
Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance.” In it, Fama said that “in studies of 
long-term stock return anomalies, overreaction to new information is as 
underreaction, and postevent continuation is as frequent as postevent reversal (Abstract by 
Johann de Villiers, CFA Digest).” In other words, overreaction and underreaction support rather 
than rebut the idea of efficient markets, as they are to be expected if markets are efficient 
(Brooks & Byrne, 2008).
To address this, several behavioral models have been developed to explain the 
circumstances. For Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), the explanation came in the form of 
two concepts previously discussed in this paper: investor conservatism and representativeness. 
According to their approach, investors see patterns in random data and begin to infer things 
about the company's future based on the company's recent earnings announcement, thus creating 
overreaction. For Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subrahmanyam, the explanation came in the form of 
overconfidence and self-attribution. Investors put more weight on private information than they 
do on public information; this can lead to overreaction in the stock price. Then when that private 
information is made public, there is an underreaction that moves to correct the stock-price, but 
only partially. However, the self-attribution bias kicks in, as this public information confirms 
investors' initial private signal, thus leading to a surge in their confidence in their initial action 
and potentially resulting in even more overreaction.
Expanding on the concept of representativeness bias, multiple studies have been done in 
attempts to explain why investors will make decisions based on superficial- characteristics such 
as opposed to underlying probabilities. This includes, for example, the assumption that a “good” 
company is therefore a good investment. Shefrin and Statman (1995) administered a survey with
common as
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results indicating that respondents saw companies listed in the annual Fortune magazine as good 
investments because the companies’ shares do well and they have a good corporate reputation. 
However, these companies are normally large-cap companies that have low book-to-market 
ratios, and as Statman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) found, these are the 
same kinds of companies that actually exhibit low returns. In a more recent study, Statman,\ 
Fisher and Anginer (2008) found results similar to those found in the Shefrin and Statman 1995 
article, with results indicating that investors prefer stocks they see have been positive as of late. 
This in turn boosts the prices of these stocks, but also depresses their returns.
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) came up with even 
consistent with the representativeness bias. They studied 95 companies who, during 1998 and 
1999, changed their corporate names to dotcom names. This produced abnormal returns for their 
stocks- returns that didn't appear to reverse or have a negative drift post-announcement (that is, 
the value increase was permanent). Even more interesting is that fact that some of these 
companies didn't even have any substantial involvement or relationship with the Internet. Just the 
association with the Internet was enough to lead to “investor mania.”
interesting findingsmore
To sum up, results of many studies in the field of behavioral finance suggest that 
investors are not as rational as EMH and the CAPM assume them to be. This is turn suggests 
why often times the CAPM is found to be empirically invalid, as was shown to be the case in the 
study done in this paper.
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VI. Conclusion
The results yielded in the test for this study- as well as many other past empirical tests- 
have found that the CAPM may not hold. This could be due to a number of things. On one hand, 
it could be largely due to the fact that it is a linear model that only accounts for one type of risk. 
On the other hand, the problem may lie in the fundamentals: in the assumptions that the model 
holds. Traditional finance holds that markets are efficient- that stock prices reflect all available 
information instantaneously and accurately mainly because of the assumption investors are 
rational. But efficient market hypothesis has its critics, and the hypothesis arguably may not 
hold. And how can the CAPM hold if its fundamentals aren't even valid? The test in this paper 
supports the hypothesis that the CAPM may not be a valid model, and an analysis through 
behavioral finance has been done in attempts to better understand why this is- why the CAPM's 
assumptions may not be correct.
Behavioral finance uses both psychological characteristics and biases to explain why 
investors behave the way they do, which is arguably that they are not rational like EMH and the 
CAPM assume. There is no unified, standard theory of behavioral finance that currently exists. It 
is a fairly new field in which a vast amount of research is still being done. The goal is to simply 
provide a better picture of the implications of behavioral biases in finance in attempts to perhaps 
improve the process by which investors make decisions (Olsen, 1998).
The field itself is very multi-faceted and cross-disciplinary. There 
aspects to be considered when studying behaviors in the financial market: rational managers 
versus irrational asset investors, irrational asset managers, individual investors, the role of ethics 
in investing, etc. Using Byrnes and Brooks' article “Behavioral Finance: Theories and Evidence” 
as a guide, the facets and studies brought up in this paper are just a small piece of the overall 
picture of behavioral finance. There are countless arguments regarding the field: some believe 
markets really are efficient; others choose to turn to behavioral finance. Whatever the case, one 
thing can't be denied: both the CAPM and behavioral finance have revolutionized how we think 
about finance and investments.
certainly otherare
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II. MODEL 1 TESTS: UNIT ROOTS, HETEROSKEDASTICITY, SERIAL 
CORRELATION, ARCH EFFECTS, AND OMITTED VARIABLES
Table 2.1: Dicky-Fuller for Unit Roots
VARIABLE DFULLER
rspSOOrf 
Apple 
JP Morgan
-8.442… 
-9.703… 
-10.986*** 
-9.683*** 
■11.088… 
-10.778… 
-11.128*** 
-8.451*** 
-7.929… 
-9.830*** 
-10.669*** 
•11.333… 
-11.050*** 
■9.978… 
-9.640*** 
-10.836…
GE
UPS
BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Teva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
p<0.01,**p<0.05，*p<0_l
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Table 2.2: BREUSCH-PAGAN / COOK WEISBERG TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
(HETTEST)
CHTVARIABLE
Apple 
JP Morgan
1.98**
23.36
0.54**_GE
9.05*
0.52***
UPS
BP
2.14**S&P500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Tcva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
11.78
0.18*** 
40.59 
4.90*** 
0.00*** 
0.71 …
18.38
6.10,
45.93
p<0.01, •• p<0.05, * p<0.1***
Tabic 2.3: DURBIN-WATSON TEST FOR SERIAL CORRELATION
D-STATISTICVARIABLE
Apple 
JP Morgan
2.01
2.06
2.21GE
UPS 2.10
2.14BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Teva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
2.01
1.56
1.36
1.85
2.03
1.92
2.11
1.99
1.88
2.02
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Table 2.4: RAMSEY RESET TEST FOR OMITTED VARIABLES
VARIABLE F-STATISTIC
Apple 
JP Morgan
1.18**
2.91** 
0.50*** 
1.83** 
2.87** 
0.39*** 
0.15… 
0.05*** 
0.51*** 
2.41 *• 
0.33*** 
0.96*" 
2.51** 
1.86** 
0.06***
GE
UPS
BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Tcva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
p<0.01，** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: BREUSCH-GODFREY LM TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION
CHI2VARIABLE
0.02…Apple 
JP Morgan 0.288… 
1.29** 
0.282*** 
0.93*** 
0.05*** 
5.68*
GE
UPS
BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Teva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
10.67
0.64… 
0.08*** 
0.00*** 
0.42… 
0.00*** 
0.37… 
0.02***
p<0.01，"p<0.05，*p<0.1
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Table 2.6: LM TEST FOR AUTOREGRESSIVE CONDITIONAL HETEROSKEDASTICITY (ARCHLM).
CHTVARIABLE
1.79**Apple 
JP Morgan 1.08** 
7.53* 
0.00*** 
0.70*** 
2.73** 
0.04*** 
0.36*** 
0.08*** 
0.15*** 
0.14*** 
1.28** 
0.11 … 
2.72〃 
0.01***
GE
UPS
BP
S&P 500 Index 
Rogers 
Coca-Cola 
Teva
Caterpillar
Target
Panera Bread 
IBM
Chesapeake 
Berkshire Hathaway
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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